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Summary:
The quest for sustainability has put the conventional Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) technique
under fierce attack. Much of the critique is, however, misplaced or based on
misunderstandings. Alternative methodologies for project appraisal are of ten insufficient for
making the unavoidable hard choices on resource use and distribution. The paper further
argues that it is impossible to formulate any unified and operational definition of sustainability
applicable to project appraisaL. As an alternative strategy, two basic concerns in the
sustainability debate, environmental and distributional, are identified. The paper explores how
these can be integrated into the consistent framework which CBA provides. This expansion
of the conventional analysis, which is labeled Environmental and Social CBA (ESCBA),
particularly focuses on environmental valuation, distributional weights, and discounting.
Sammendrag:
Interessen for bærekraftg utvikling har ført til kritikk av tradisjonell nytte-kostnadsanalyse
(NKA). Mye av denne kritikken er imidlertid ubegrunnet eller basert på misforståelser.
Alternative metoder for prosjektvurdering vil ofte være utilstrekkelige for å foreta vanskelige
valg knyttet til ressursbruk og fordeling. Notatet argumenterer videre for at det er umulig å
formulere meningsfulle og operasjonaliserbare kriterier for bærekraftighet i prosjekt-
vurderinger. Som en alternativ strategi identifiseres først to mål som står sentralt i
bærekraftighetsdebatten; miljø- og fordelingshensyn. Dernest drøftes hvordan disse kan
integreres i NKA. Denne utvidelsen av tradisjonell NKA fokuserer spesielt på miljøverdsetting,
fordelingsvekter og diskontering.
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1 Introduction 1
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is facing strong criticism among environmentally
concerned scholars (e.g., Booth, 1994; Drepper and Månsson, 1993; Hanley, 1992;
van Pelt, 1993; Schulze, 1994). We argue that a large share ofthe criticism ofCBA
is either misplaced or based on misunderstandings about the method. Furthermore,
we show that through the application of a pragmatic approach, already available
methods can be used to incorporate the main sustainability concerns into the
existing CBA techniques.
While recognizing the many diffculties involved in applying CBA to project
appraisal, and that other competing methods are available, we use CBA as our
point of departure for several reasons. Generally, CBA provides a consistent
methodology for project appraisal. In doing so, however, it raises certain problems
which other methods also face even if only implicitly. Typically, other "softer"
methods do not have much to offer when it comes to the hard choices: should, for
instance, some environmental resources be sacrificed in order to increase the
welfare of the poor living in a vilage? Whereas we do not believe that CBA, or
even the expanded CBA we advocate, can provide precise answers to such
questions, its merits lies in two areas. First, the trade-offs and hard choices
involved are made explicit and confronted directly, and not assumed away
implicitly. We believe that better choices can be reached only if the available
alternativ es are c1early stated and their consequences made as transparent as
possible. Second, it provides a coherent framework within which the various
arguments relating to the costs and benefits involved in such a trade-off can be
assessed. Although we may not be able to quantify and value all effects, CBA wil
provide useful information on the relative merits of different projects given what
information is available.
A common argument against CBA relates to its apparent conflict with the notion of
sustainability. In section two, we discuss the two main definitions of sustainable
development commonly found in the environmental economics literature, that is,
the "non-dec1ining welfare" and the "constant natural capital" approaches. In our
view, neither of these approaches offers definitions or criteria that are very useful
guides for project selection. We therefore identify two main concerns in the
sustainability debate that can form reasonable bases for formulating such criteria.
These are a concern for human welfare of the poor in both the present and future
generations (distributional concern), and a concern that environmental degradation
now may seriously hamper overall human welfare (environmental concern).
This paper was prepared for the 25th Aniversar Conference on Development Projects: Issues
for the 1990s; Development and Project Planning Centre, University of Bradford, UK, 6 - 8
April 1995. We would like to thank our colleagues Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, who worked with us on
the report which this article is based on, Richard Moorsom, Arne Wiig, and M. Asaduzzaman
for constrctive comments to draft versions ofthis paper. The usual disclaimer applies. Funding
for the project has been provided by the Norwegian Research CounciL.
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The challenge then is, how can these concerns be incorporated into a consistent
framework for project assessment? A two-track strategy to improve the
conventional methods ofproject evaluation is put forward: first, a proper valuation
of the environmental effects of the projects, and second, a framework that gives
higher value to benefits to the poor than to the rich, either now or in the future.
Fortunately, most tools for such an approach are readily available in the economic
literature, as shown in section three. We label this approach the Environmental and
Social Cost-Benefit Analysis (ESCBA). It is only in the special cases where the
critical fuctions of the environment wil be adversely affected by the project that
the imposition of sustainability constraints is required as an addition to ESCBA.
The article is based on a study on how to integrate the sustainability concern in
project appraisal of development projects (Angelsen et aL., 1994). Thus, our
references and examples relate mainly to Third World settings. This has some
implications for the discussion; for example, valuation based on contingent
valuation (CV) of recreational services provided by the environment - an issue
receiving considerable attention in the valuation literature - is of much less
importance in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) than environmental changes that
affect production directly. Indeed, there seems to be an inverse relationship
between applicability in LDCs and the level of theoretical attention given to the
various methods. Much of our optimism with regards to the possibilities for a
successful application of CBA is because the simplest methods would frequently
be the most usefuL.
The fact that we relate our discussion to poor countries also implies that more hard
choices have to be made: Conflicts between increasing the material standard of
living and environmental preservation are much more pressing than in the rich
pars of the world where the material sacrifices necessary are often marginal
compared to those involved in LDCs. One may in fact argue that applying CBA is
more relevant and easier to defend for LDCs. Booth (1994, p. 251), who is in
general critical to CBA, suggests a moral standard which "implies that human
beings take priority when the income they require to live decently is threatened, but
that ecosystems have priority over income above this level".
2 The problem of defining sustainability
It is very hard to be against sustainabilty. In fact, the less you know about it,
the better it sounds. ... sustainabilty is an essentially vague concept, and it
would be wrong to think of it as being precise, or even capable of being
made precise (Robert Solow, 1993, pp. 179-180, Nobel Laureate in
Economics).
The concept of sustainable development was moved to the top of the international
political agenda by the World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED, 1987). It captures the widespread concern for the negative impacts of
environmental degradation on human welfare and its development into the future.
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The popularity of the "sustainable development" idea should be understood in
several ways. There is no doubt that it expresses a genuine concern with respect to
the environment and the welfare of future generations. At the same time, the
concept is sufficiently wide and vague to act as an umbrella for a large number of
movements with contradictory goals (Ruttan, 1994). It has acted as amediating
term between environmentalists and developers, who each have a stake in both
"sustainable" and "development". For analytical purposes, however, we wil argue
that the term is of limited use, and a workable definition is yet to be formulated.
There are a number of concerns driving those marching under the sustainability
banner: the present generation's poor, the well-being of future generations, the
environment in itself (in paricular, biodiversity), cultural diversity, etc. It is,
however, possible to categorize the concerns that seems to permeate them all into
two broad groups;
1. The concern for human welfare both present and future. This is known as
the instrumental view.
2. The concern for the persistence of all components of the biosphere, even
those with no apparent benefits to humanity. This is the deep ecological
view.2
Even though the ecological view has few followers in its pure version, it has had
far-reaching implications for environmental economists in their effort to
incorporate environmental values in the neoc1assical paradigm. The concept of
existence value has been introduced to capture the non-us e values people assign to
environmental resources. Thus, when it comes to the measurement of people's
preferences (that is, environmental valuation), the distinction between the
instrumental and the deep ecology view is not as sharp as it appears: whether
people assign values to environmental goods because of their "use" or "existence"
value is of minor theoretical importance, and should both be included in a CBA.
It should also be noted that an instrumental view does not imply that terms like
"rights of nature" or "rights of future generations" are meaningless. The essential
point is that such rights (viewed as restrictions on current human activities) are
granted by human beings in the present generation. Rather than viewing this as a
very anthropocentric view, we take this to be the logical consequence of the simple
fact that nature or future generations cannot participate in the current
decision-making process. Again, this problem would not be confined to CBA, as
any criteria chosen and decision made would reflect our, that is, human beings of
the present generation's preferences.
Moving to the attempts at operationalizing the concept of sustainable development,
auseful framework or typology is provided by, among others, Pearce et aL. (1990).
They consider development to be a vector of several desirable social objectives.
Possible elements in the vector are increases in real income per capita,
See for example Redclift (l987) and Booth (l994) for comparisons ofthese views.
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improvements in health and nutritional status, a "fairer" distribution of income, and
increases in 'basic freedoms. Development is said to occur if this vector increases,
and we have sustainable development if this pattern stretches over a long period of
time.
This approach is in line with most definitions of sustainable development
suggested in the economic literature, which can be summarized in the phrase
"non-declining welfare over time". An early statement of this principle is
Tietenberg (1984, p. 33): "The sustainability criterion suggests that, at a minimum,
future generations should be left no worse off than current generations. " However,
definitions along this line - or any others, for that matter - do not address the more
difficult issues of;
. Which elements should be included in the "development vector"?
· What weight should be given to each element?
· To what extent can a decline in one element be compensated for by an
increase in others (substitution)? Must all components in the vector increase
in order to have sustainable development?
It is exactly this kind of questions that welfare economics and its applied branch,
CBA, attempts to deal with. Thus, the non-declining welfare approach to
sustainability leads us directly into the core of CBA.
One noteworthy attempt towards operationalization of the concept is the constant
natural capital approach. There are at least three different views on the relevance
of the constant natural capital approach to sustainable development: first, some
authors use this concept as the definition of sustainable development (Pearce et al.,
1990). Second, others view it as a precondition and/or an essential step towards the
operationalization of the non-declining welfare approach. Third, there is the view
that constant natural capital is not a necessar nor suffcient condition for
sustainable development. Some followers of this view would argue that the focus
should be on the total capital stock: human, physical reproducible, technological,
and natural (Mähler, 1990).
The interpretation of the concept of constant natural capital stock in the literature
usually takes the "stock - flow" and the "economic value - physical quantity" axis.
The instrumental view and CBA are generally more concerned with the flows
(which, of course, are closely related to the size of stocks), and more so with the
value than the quantity of flows. This diverges from the more common
interpretation of constant natural capital as constant physical stocks. At a glance,
one would expect the latter to be easier to operationalize, but it faces problems and
involves trade-offs which are difficult to resolve. Maintaining the physical quantity
of (each kind of) natural capital stock could be interpreted as:
1. Always use renewable resources according to the following rule: h :: g,
where h is the hare st rate of the resource and g its regenerative rate. Here,
4
the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is frequently proposed as the main
guide for the sustainable exploitation of the resource.
2. Always keep waste flows to the environment (w) at or below the
assimilative capacity of the environment (a), that is, according to the rule:
w~ a.
3. Never exploit non-renewable resources.
Some caveats to the rules above are necessar. The third rule is both unealistic and
impractical to abide by. The main solution to this problem seems to be that insofar
as nonrenewable resources must be exploited, we must ensure that their reduced
stock is compensated for by investments in renewable resources. The Hartwick
(1977) rule tells us that under certain assumptions the consumption level may be
sustained if the economic rent from the extraction of non-renewable resources is
invested. Thus, this rule allows for substitutability between renewable and
non-renewable resources.
Secondly, the regenerative capacity of natural resources is not static. Renewable
resources can also be managed so as to improve their sustained yield.3 The meaning
of MSY is also somewhat unclear when, for example, several ecologically
dependent species are hare sted, or more generally because environmental
functions are interrelated. Then some weighted sum must be used, and the outcome
depends crucially on the weighting system applied (Clark, 1990). Moreover, the
MSY approach overlooks the costs of extraction and discounting. Cost
considerations can in fact lead to higher stocks than would be predicted by a simple
MSY rule. This is particularly so in the realistic case where harve st costs increase
with declining stocks.
Thirdly, the waste assimilative capacity of the environment can be improved, for
instance, river flows can be augmented to enhance their assimilative function. To
further complicate matters, the idea of assimilative capacity in itself is not definite,
as many ecological equilibria are possible.
Other factors that make the stipulation of conditions for sustainable development
very diffcult are the effects of population increases and of technological pro gress.
The latter improves efficiency in the use of natural resources, and increases the
scope of substituting man-made capital for natural capital. Indeed, at the core of the
debate between the "growth disciples" and the "limits-to-growth prophets" is their
different views on the future role of technological progress. We do not pursue the
controversy here for the reason given by Buchholz (1990, p. 58): "Long term
forecasts regarding economic resources and technology require divine gifts, not
degrees in economics. "
Population growth, on the other hand, may make the constant natural capital rule
insuffcient, as constant natural capital per capita may be a necessary requirement
See Hannesson (1993) for a discussion ofthis point with regards to fisheries management.
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for non-decreasing welfare per capita. Other problems arise from risk, uncertainty,
and irreversibility.4
Thus, we can conclude that neither the "non-declining welfare" nor the "constant
natural capitaI" approaches provide readily applicable definitions of (or conditions
for) sustainable development, and we subscribe to the view of Solow in the
opening quote. Whereas these concepts are potentially useful for guiding macro
level policies, they are even more difficult to translate into meaningful
sustainability criteria at the project level. Any attempt to define a sustainability
criteria at the micro level would lead us into situations where applying the criteria
would be too rigid. Moreover, any sustainability criteria that may be designed
would in many situations not guide us on how to spend available resources
effciently nor which project(s) to select. This is the background for the
provocative statement by two of the founders of Social CBA, Little and Mirrlees
(1991, p. 365): "Whether a project is sustainable has nothing to do with whether it
is desirable."
It is hard to imagine any decision rule that does not involve some balancing of
costs and benefits. Given this, our approach is to carefully look at the underlying
concern for sustainability, and see how these can be integrated in a consistent
framework for project appraisal, that is CBA. We interpret the quest for sustainable
development to arise from two basic concerns:
1. A concern that curent environmental degradation may seriously reduce
human welfare, and the fact that present policies and practices do not take
sufficient account ofthis effect (an environmental concern).
2. A concern for human welfare of the poor in both the present and future
generations (a distributional concern)
In a broad sense, this interpretation is not new; for example, Veeman (1989)
interprets sustainable development to consist of three critical sub-components:
growth, distribution and environment. Policies and project appraisal practices have,
conventionally, emphasized the growth component, often implicitly. The
redirection suggested by the sustainability debate is to put more emphasis on
distributional and environmental effects.
Generally the economic literature on sustainability tends to limit the distributional
concern to intergenerational justice. In line with the WCED (1987), we argue for
the inclusion of also intragenerational justice, i.e., the distribution within the
present generation, in the concept for two reasons. First, our concern for the future
is base d on the real possibility that future generations may not enjoy the same level
0fwelfare as the present generation. If this is so, then there should be no reason
why the present generation's poor should be excluded from the same consideration.
"There is something inconsistent about people who pro fess to be terribly concerned
4 Due to space constraints, this paper does not address the problem of risk in project assessment.
See Angelsen et al. (1994) for a discussion. Lind (l982) gives a comprehensive treatment of
these issues based on neoclassical economic theory.
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about the welfare of future generations but do not seem to be terribly concerned
about the welfare ofpoor people today" (Solow, 1993, p. 185).
Second, most environmental problems in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are
caused or escalated by povert, and the unequal intragenerational distribution of
resources both nationally and globally. Thus, in order to solve the intergenerational
problem we must also address the present skewed intragenerational distribution.
3 Including environmental and distributional effects in CBA
The main issue in this section, deriving from the above discussion, is how to
incorporate the environmental and distributional concerns in the CBA
methodology. CBA is a conceptual framework for the evaluation of the social
desirability of a project. The CBA procedure attempts to quantify and value
different types of costs and benefits, occuring at different points in time, into one
common unit, that is, the net present value (NPV). Bojö et aL. (1990, pp. 57-58)
summarizes the general understanding of the content of CBA:
A coherent method to organize information about social advantages
(benefits) and disadvantages (costs) in terms of a common monetary unit.
Benefits and costs are primarily valued on the basis of individuals
wilingness to pay for goods and services, marketed or not, as viewed
through a social welfare ordering representing the preferences of the
relevant decision-maker. The flow of monetary units over time are brought
together to a net present value. Unvalued effects (intangibles) are described
quantitatively or qualitatively and put against valued items.
As there exist a large number of excellent texts on CBA both in general and as
applied to developing countries, we shall not go into further details on the
underlying principles of CBA. 5 One clarification may, nevertheless, be in order.
Many people react against the idea of reducing the value of (the services from) the
environment into monetary terms, or assume that economic criteria in themselves
are biased against the environment and future generations. liA large body of people
are nervous about what they think economists are up to" (Winpenny, 1991b, p.
381). Much of this fear is based on the lack of distinction between two separate
issues: the present economic policies and the interests of the economic
power-holders in many countries, on the one hand, and the principles of economic
theory, on the other.
The use of monetary units as the unit of measurement (numéraire) does not imply
any bias towards goods sold in a market, or a view that "money is all that counts".
In principle,any numéraire could have been used, but a monetar measure is
conveniently chosen as it is commonly us ed as a measure of value. Hence, we
5 The methodology on Social CBA (SCBA) for developing countries was developed by Dasgupta,
Marglin and Sen (1972), Little and Mirlees (1969 and 1974), and Squire and van der Tak
(1975). Ray (1984) gives a very good overview of the theoretical foundations of SCBA.
Noteworthy presentations of the method als o include ODA (1988) and Brent (1990).
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disagree with the statement by van Pelt (1993, p. 29) that "CBA's monetar
numéraire is likely to be the major obstacle to the incorporation of environmental
effects in efficiency measurement under broad welfare concepts." Everyhing
which is valued by people should, in principle, be inc1uded in a CBA.
Some costs and benefits are obviously more difficult to quantify, but this does not
imply that they are less valuable. We have no problem realizing that in practice
measurable costs and benefits have usually been given more attention. Besides the
practical explanation regarding data availability, this also reflects an important
aspect of the political economy of environmental degradation: measurable benefits
of resource degradation will often be appropriated by the few (and powerful),
whereas the more diffuse costs are shared by the many. While this practice does not
derive any support from economic theory, it may be supported by powerful interest
groups in society. It is not well founded, but well funded.
To facilitate the further discussion, we briefly outline in Table 1 below the main
steps used to assess the environmental impacts of a project, us ing the CBA
technique.6 All the listed steps are important in the ESCBA we advocate; however,
the processes in steps 4 and 5 assurne greater emphasis here. Steps 2 to 4 capture
our first main point that environmental effects of projects be properly identified,
quantified, and valued, while step 5 accommodates the concern for inter- and
intragenerational equity - our second main point.
1. Defining the alternatives (or projects)
2. Identification ofthe major environmental effects (costs and benefits)
3. Quantification in physical terms of the environmental effects
4. Valuation of the environmental effects
5. Weighing of the costs and benefits
a. Between different income groups (intratemporal): distributional
weights
b. In time (intertemporal): discounting
6. Sensitivity and risk analysis
7. Modifications of the project(s) and policy recommendations
Table 1. The main steps of ESCBA.
The identification of major environmental effects (step 2) is not unique to ESCBA,
but necessary for most methods. The identification of major environmental effects
is not an area where economists have their comparative advantage. Their
contribution here may be in the selection of which effects ne ed to be studied
fuher, based on preliminar estimates on their relative importance to welfare.
This selection, known as "scoping" (Bisset, 1987, p. 5) wil always be necessary
due to resource and time constraints.
6 Table L draws partlyon Bojö et aL. (1990).
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The quantification in physical terms of the environmental effects (step 3) raises
more diffcult problems than the identification. Auseful tool in the quantification
process is the development of an effect matrix. The most well-known effect matrix
is the Leopold et al. (1971) matrix, which is a horizontal list of development
activities and a verticallist of environmental parameters. The effect matrix would
often need to have several dimensions: It may be essential to differentiate between
different effects in time, in space, and between different income groups.
Steps 2 and 3 listed in Table 1 are often referred to as Environmental Impact
Assessment (ElA), though the definition of ElA varies in the literature. Some use it
to cover most methodologies applicable to the analysis of environmental
consequences, including CBA and economic modelling (Biswas and Geping,
1987). Others would include in ElA measures for reducing or eliminating any
negative environmental impacts, the implementation of these and the monitoring of
the project (Therivel et al., 1992, p. 13). For the puroses of this paper we wil
narrow the definition of EIA to cover the identification and physical quantification
of the environmental consequences of projects, while CBA covers the socIal
valuation of these effects. This corresponds to the actual focus in the literature on
EIA and CBA. The EIA term is mainly used by engineers and natural scientists,
whereas economists use CBA. It also reflects an appropriate division of labour
between the disciplines. The above definitions imply that EIA and CBA are not
alternative but rather complementary methods: EIA should be considered as a part
of the overall ESCBA process. Following Cooper (1981), we consider EIA to be a
specifcation technique of environmental consequences, whereas the bulk of CBA
is concerned with valuation techniques.
The specification techniques would not vary too much between various methods
for environmental assessment, and they form the basis for any valuation to be done.
Schulze (1994, pp. 197-198) states that "undervaluation of poorly understood
impacts" is one of three biases of CBA. This is certainly true, but the same could
be said about any method. No method could have captured the damage on the
ozone layer caused by CFC emissions before science discovered the effect!
The distinction between specification and valuation techniques also reveal the main
flaw with several of the methods suggested as alternatives to CBA: they do not
provide a consistent method or criteria for determining which projects are worthy
of implementation. The same is true for Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA), which is
more to be considered as an alternative to CBA. MCA does not provide a
consistent procedure on how the different criteria should be weighted together in
the overall analysis. Most alternative methods are not wrong, per se, but simply
insufficient.
One possible escape route here is for the project analyst to leave the final weighting
to the decision-maker or the decision-making process. Indeed, one may argue that
this is always the case in practice - results of the EIA, (ES)CBA or MCA would be
but one of several inputs into the decision process. However, the EIA or MCA
9
procedures for project selection are likely to be less consistent than if perforrned
using a systematic application of the CBA technique. The result could be less
environmental protection, less poverty reduction and/or less overall economic
growth, because the weights given to these goals are likely to vary considerably
between projects. The ESCBA provides a consistent framework for valuing
environmental effects, and balancing the growth, distributional and environmental
objectives.
3.1 Valuation of environmental efJects
The valuation of environmental effects involves putting prices or socIal values on
physical environmental changes. The prices used in CBA are shadow prices, which
can be defined as the socIal value of one unit of a good, or the marginal effect on
socIal welfare of a unit change in the quantity of the good. "Economic benefits and
costs of a project can be defined only by the effect of the project on some
fundamental objectives of the economy" (Ray, 1984, p. 9). If the objective is to
maximize total individual welfare in society, the classical utilitarian approach, then
valuation should be based on individual preferences as expressed through their
wilingness to pay (WTP). As such, the phrase "environmental valuation" is very
misleading (Pearce, 1993, p. 4): economists "only" try to measure preferences, and
thereby reveal peoples' valuation of the environment.
Market prices are often the most useful starting point for estimating shadow prices.
To estimate shadow prices from market prices at least three modifications need to
be made. First, they have to be corrected for any market distortions, that is cases
where market prices do not reflect marginal valuation and marginal costs.7 Second,
estimation of prices for non-market goods must be undertaken (see below). Third,
market prices need to be adjusted to give different weights to costs and benefits
occurring to different groups, which has both an intra- and intertemporal aspect.
This is a way to build in explicIt policy objectives in the appraisal. A comparison
between the ESCBA we advocate and the Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA)
advocated by van Pelt (1993), reveals that the differences in part are only semantic.
"MCA is characterized by a weighting system involving relative priorities of
policy-makers or any other group affected by projects" (p. 27). On the other hand,
ESCBA uses weights that are determined partly by individual preferences (as
approximated through adjusted market prices) and partly by the decision-makers'
preferences and priorities.
The most common valuation methods are listed in Table 2, and grouped according
to the extent by which existing markets and the prices found in these can be used as
a points of departure for the valuation (Bojö et aL., 1990). Space does not permit
any detailed discussion ofthevarious valuation methods. Winpenny (199la), gives
a comprehensive and accessible overview of valuation methods for projects in
LDCs.
7 See any standard texts on CBA for a fuher discussion.
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1. Valuation using conventional markets
* Effect on production (EOP)
* Human capital (H C)
* Preventive expenditure (avoid damage) (PE)
* Replacement costs (restore after damage) (RC)
2. Valuation using implicit markets
* Travel cost (TC)
* Hedonic prices (HP): property value (PV) & wage differentials (WD)
3. Valuation using arificial markets
* Contingent valuation (CV)
Table 2. Overview of diferent valuation methods.
As Winpenny (199la,b) rightly observes, there seems to be a negative correlation
between the usefulness of the methods applicable in LDCs and the space they
receive in methodological writings. The simplest methods, i.e., the Effect on
Production (EOP), the Replacement Costs (RC), and the Preventive Expenditure
(PE), have proven to be the most usefuL. These methods are able to capture most of
the costs affecting the local population associated with serious environmental
probIerns, such as soil erosion and deforestation. On the other hand, the Contingent
Valuation (CV), Hedonic Price (HP), Travel Cost (TC), and Human Capital (HC)
methods, while receiving considerable attention in the literature, have more limited
applicability in LDCs. The CV and TC methods have been developed primarily to
deal with the valuation of non-market environmental goods in richer societies, for
example, recreational services which generally are highly income-elastic.
We would therefore recommend that efforts be concentrated on a more systematic
application of EOP, RC and PE methods in the evaluation of environmental effects
of development projects. Experimental studies of the four other methods would
definitely be of interest, and of potential value in the future. As for the EOP, HC,
RC and PE methods, lack of data seems to be a problem resulting mainly from the
side of the natural sciences.
The weighting of the various costs and benefits should ideally provide a conc1usion
on the desirability of the project. Lack of or uncertain data is always a problem,
especially in LDCs. The guiding rule should be to quantify and value the effects
whenever reliable estimates can be made. The meaning of "reliable" would, to
some extent, be based on subjective judgements. One should avoid both "number
fetishism" (variables are quantified in spite of very uneliable data) and "number
phobia" (variables are not quantified because they are not commonly thought of in
quantitative terrns).
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As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, decision-makers wil in the end base their
conclusion on both quantitative and qualitative assessments. Even though it is hard
to avoid some qualitative judgements, CBA can in a number of cases filter out
either the very good or the very bad alternatives. And it is exactly in these cases
that the costs of a wrong decision are highest: either to implement a very bad
project, or not to implement a very good one. For projects with a NPV around zero
the costs in terms of reduced efficiency in the allocation of scarce resources is
relatively small. CBA cannot provide precise answers, but can give a highly useful
picture of the relative merits of the alternatives (Lind, 1982, p. 24).
3.2 Distributional weights
The conventional CBA gives equal weight to marginal income changes to all
individuals, regardless of their initial income. It is based on the Pareto-criterion and
the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation principle. This is commonly considered a
pure efficiency criterion, and the equity objective of society is ignored. One should,
however, note that the term "efficiency" has acquired a rather misleading
interpretation in the economic literature. The term itself generally refers to the
extent to which certain means attain the stated ends. Using the term without
specifying the ends is therefore meaningless. The way the term is commonly used
in the economics literature implicitly assurnes that growth in total income (GNP) is
the only objective; other goals likedistribution are ignored.
It is equally misleading when some, e.g., van Pelt et aL. (1990) label the CBA
without distribution weights Economic CBA (ECBA), as opposed to SCBA. There
is nothing in welfare economics saying that income changes to all individuals
should be given the same weight in a welfare assessment (project appraisal),
though this has been the most common practice. The term Social CBA is therefore
in many ways inappropriate. "In the folklore of project work, the term "socIal"
symbolizes loose thinking, and the term "efficiency" is nothing short of being a
rallying cry" (Ray, 1984, p. 11). Indeed, we may put ourselves in a glass-house by
us ing the term ESCBA, as both environmental and social considerations should
have been included in CBA in any case.
The reason why distributional effects are ignored may have several explanations,
one being the assumption that the issue of distribution should be left to politicians
after the economists have given their advice on how to maximize total income.
"Income-distributional ... aspects of any project or program, ... are not part of that
package of expertise that distinguishes the professional economist from the rest of
humanity", argues Harberger (1971, p. 785), one of the most outspoken defenders
of the conventional approach. It follows, in this line of argument, that there are
efficient policy instruments available to achieve the desired distribution. "Lets first
make the cake as big as possible, and then decide on how to share it" is a basic
postulate.
We believe this position is wrong for two reasons. First, there is a relationship
between the size of the cake and how we cut it, so the distributional aspect cannot
12
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be separated from the objective of maximization of national income or welfare (cf.
the long-standing discussion on the Kusnetz curve). Second, the means for
redistribution of income are far from perfect. Thus, if society has a more equal
income distribution as one of its objectives, distributional considerations should be
a part of the criteria for project selection and design. The conventional two step
procedure often suggested in these circumstances, would not give an optimal
solution. The growth and distribution issues must be solved simultaneously.
A second reason as to why conventional CBA gives little attention to distributional
aspects is the fact that one has to introduce some rather rigid assumptions about the
socIal welfare function and individual utility fuctions. To make interpersonal
welfare comparisons, we need a cardinal measure of individual utility (cf. Arrow's
(Im)possibility theorern). Measurable utility is not a par of the standard theory of
consurner behaviour, where the ordinal theory is suffcient. The ordinal theory
leaves us only with the Pareto-criterion, which is not very helpful in most
interesting cases. Cardinal or measurable utility is clearly a problematic concept.
However, for a formal analysis of income distribution beyond the Pareto-criterion,
there is no escape route.
To single out the specific state among all the Pareto-optimal sets which gives us
the highest welfare of the society, we need an indicator which makes it possible for
us to assign different values (or weights) to marginal income increases accruing to
different income groups. Such a framework is provided by SocIal Cost-Benefit
Analysis (SCBA). A key parameter in SCBA is the distributional weights (d¡) This
is the factor by which an income increase to a particular individual or group, i,
should be multiplied in the overall welfare valuation. Under certainassumptions
this weight can be written as;8
di = ( ~: r
where ca is the average consumption level, used as a benchmark, and Ci denotes
consumption of group i. n ~ O is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to
consumption, and a key parameter in the analysis. The higher the value of n, the
higher the weight given to consumption increases of low income groups (strong
preferences for a more equal income distribution). For example, if n = 1, and
individual P's consumption is only half of the average, a consumption increase to P
is valued twice as much as the same monetar increase to a person at the average
consumption leve!. If n = 2, the increase to the poor P is valued four times as
much.
Byapplying distributional weights for different income groups, SCBA handles two
social objectives: the total income growth, and the distribution of the income. The
net present value (NPV) of the project is therefore estimated at social prices, that
is, the distributional effects are taken into account.
g A complete derivation ofsuch weights is given in the major texts on SCBA, see footnote 5.
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If there is asymmetry between the distribution of costs and benefits, the use of
SCBA instead of CBA can influence the outcome of the analysis significantly. One
can argue that this is a major characteristic of many development projects with
significant environmental effects: the environmental costs are commonly bome by
the poor, whereas a small er group of rich people get the benefits. This would
typically be the case for large scale resource extraction or land use projects in rural
areas. The resource use by outside companies (governent or private) wil often
compete with local uses. Therefore environmental degradation has effects not only
on intergenerational distribution, but on intragenerational distribution as well.
Under such circumstances, using SCBA rather than the conventional CBA would
not only select projects more beneficial to the poor, but also favour projects
oriented towards conservation of natural resources. Negative environmental effects
are given higher weights because the poor bear the costs. Similarly, the benefits
would be given lower weights because the relatively richer groups reap the
benefits, and income increases to the rich are valued relatively less in the analysis.
The use of distributional weights as a possible way to prornote sustainability in
project appraisal has, to our knowledge, not been elaborated in the literature on
SCBA and environmental assessment.
3.3 Discounting
Economists did not - contrary to widespread opinlOn - invent
short-sightedness and greed, but they have studied the weighing of future
values as revealed by people 's aetual behaviour. Many economists have in
faet looked upon discounting as (at least partially) an expression of human
irrationality (Bojö et aL., 1990, p. 66).
The general purpose of discounting is to make it possible to compare costs and
benefits at different points in time, and to transfer them into a common unit of
measurement - the NPV. The issue is unavoidable in project analysis: no
discounting implies a discount rate of zero percent. Discounting is a complex topic,
often misunderstood, widely disputed, and "a subject exhibiting simultaneously a
very considerable degree of knowledge and a very substantiallevel of ignorance"
(Baumol, 1968, p. 788). This is unfortunate, as the choice of discount rate may be
crucial for the outcome of the analysis. Particularly when there is a large lag in
time between costs and benefits, the discount rate could be the single most
important factor in determining the sign of the NPV.
Discounting relates to the sustainability debate in at least two important ways.
First, it is directly related to the question of intergenerational justice. Second, the
discount rate may have important consequences for the environmental impacts of
the project portfolio that passes the NPV test. Contrary to popular beliefs, there is
no clear-cut relationship between the size of the discount rate and environmental
conservation. Consider a hydropower development project that requires high initial
investments, to produce some benefits (electricity), but at the same time has some
environmental costs. Lowering the disco unt rate would in this case increase the
14
L
I
NPV of the project, thereby increasing the number of projects acceptable and the
overall environmental damage.9 It is also argued that higher discount rates wil
"slow down the general pace of development through depressing effects on
investment. ... the demand for natural resources is generally less with high discount
rates than with lower ones" (Markandya and Pearce, 1988, p. 3).!0
Even though one may argue that for certain projects, a lower discount rate wil
have a conservation effect, it is not valid as a general argument. U sing the discount
rate to prornote environmental conservation would be a non-target solution, and
wil in many cases have the opposite effect. Further, there is little theoretical
foundation for arguing that the existence of large environmental effects, per se,
should make us lower the disco unt rate. This does not suggest that the presently
used rates should not be lowered. Neither does it exc1ude environmental
considerations from having an indirect bearing on the level of the discount rate.
To derive the factors that should determine the level of the social discount rate, we
assurne that the objective of economic policy is to maximize the welfare of the
society over time. By assumptions similar to the ones used for the derivation of
distributional weights, one arrives at the following formula for the discount rate;!!
i = ng + p
where i is the consumption rate of interest, that is the rate at which consumption
should be discounted. n is, as before, the elasticity of marginal utility of
consumption, g is the annual growth rate of consumption; and p is the rate of pure
time preference. According to this formula, we have two basic reasons for
discounting. First, we place less weight on future increases in consumption simply
because we have become richer. As n is assumed to be positive, a marginal
increase in the consumption of a rich consurner in a future generation entails less
increase in welfare than the same increase to the relatively poor consumer of the
present generation.
This reason for discounting is paralleI to the one used when discussing
intragenerational distribution in SCBA. The discussions on the inter- and
intragenerational distribution are closely linked - both are related to our preferences
for consumption increases to the poor, as expressed through the parameter n. The
considerations that underlie the concern for intergenerational equity also apply to
9 This would be tre if the benefits and envIronmental costs remain constant over time. Jf we have
increasing envIronmental costs relative to the benefits, it tums out that raising the discount rate
increases the NPV for low levels of the discount rate and reduces the NPV f0l. high levels. See
Angelsen (1991, p. 8) and Porter (1982) for details.
io See Angelsen (199l, chap. 3) for an elaboration of the effect of changing discount rates. Porter
(1982) gives a clear presentation of the analysis of projects like hydropower, whereas Farzin
(1985) and Stollery (1990) discuss the ambiguous effect of a lower discount rate on resource
extraction.
Il Again, Angelsen et al. (l994) and most SCBA texts wil provide the details.
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intragenerational equity, which is our main argument for including intratemporal
distribution in the sustainability concept.
The second reason for discounting is the pure time preference. The case when p )-
O implies that we have some impatience, and would prefer early consumption to
later consumption, even if the consumption level is the same. The pure time
preference is a controversial issue. There is little doubt that most people are
impatient and have a positive rate of pure time preference. The main question is,
however, whether individual myopia should have any bearing on social discount
rates. As first shown by Strotz (1955/56), p )- O represents an inconsistency if the
individual's objective is lifetime welfare maximization. If pure time preference is a
kind of irrationality, it is hard to justify that p should be positive and thereby have
an impact on the social discount rate. The environmental debate has highlighted the
problem of short-sightedness in public policy making, and conservationists will
find support in the economIc literature (Sen, 1961 and 1982; Pearce and Nash,
1981; Markandya and Pearce, 1988).
If we conclude that pure time preferences are unacceptable in determining the
social discount rate (p = O), then we are left with the first argument for discounting
- consumption growth combined with diminishing marginal welfare of
consumption increases. There are strong arguments for the case that future
consumption growth will (or should) be significantly limited by environmental
(and possibly also other) constraints. This is indeed already the case in many
developing countries. The World Bank (1992) estimates the annualloss due to soil
erosion for many developing countries to be in the range of 0.5 - 1.5 percent of
their GNP. Ifwe have a negative rate of consumption growth (g .. O) and p = O, the
discount rate should be negative. This is consistent with a standard economic
approach to discounting, yet most economists would hesitate to draw this
conclusion. Most analysis would assurne a positive rate of economic growth, and
therefore save the case for positive discount rates.
Note also that strong preferences for a more equal distribution among individuals
today (high n), also implies a strong preference for consumption now rather than in
future periods. If we generally give a relatively high value to consumption
increases to the poor, the poor in an intergenerational perspective comprise the
present generation, not the future ones (as long as g is positive). On the other hand,
conventional CBA implicitly sets n = O when it comes to the use of distributional
weights, which implies lower discount rates according to the formula above - a
recommendation not followed in practice!
Based on thei;bove framework, one may argue forcefully that the discount rates
presently used are too high. A 10 percent discount rate seems to have got some
universal acceptance in the analysis of development projects. The main reason is
probably that it is a "nice, round figure", and that a "correct" rate could be in that
range. Following our formula above withp = O and n = 1 (which is often assumed
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- the Bernoulli case), the discount rate would equal the growth rate (g). This would
for most countries imply much lower rates than the one presently used.12
Our analysis so far is based on the assumption that we can trace all the effects
(costs and benefits ) into changes in consumption, that is consumption is our
numéraire. Most project analysis wil only consider the direct effects in monetary
terrns, and these wil generally affect both investments and consumption. A
positive rate of return on investments (capital productivity) is commonly used as an
argument for discounting. We have assumed here that any changes in investments
are transforrned into consumption changes, and a high capital productivity wil be
taken into account in that manner. If, however, we use the direct effects of a project
in the analysis (i.e., consumption is no longer the numéraire), we may need to
adjust the discount rate. For example, the discount rate should be lowered if the
decrease in investment due to one dollar investment in a project (the crowding-out
effect) is lower than the increase in other investments due to one dollar output from
the project (see Bradford, 1975, for a further discussion).
Another issue that causes some confusion is the use of the discount rate as a way to
ration capital. Though widely used in many textbooks on CBA, this confuses two
issues, namely (i) the price of capital, and (ii) the weighing of costs and benefits in
different periods (discounting). As demonstrated by Markandya and Pearce (1988),
us ing the discount rate to ration capital would generally not give an optimal
resource allocation. Discounting applies to all types of costs and benefits in the
project, whereas the price of capital itself should be used to reflect capital scarcity.
A final point is that the choIce of discount rate must be seen in relation to other
parts of the analysis. Some have argued for the use of a lower discount rate for
environmental costs and benefits because the costs or benefits may increase over
time, and future values should be given higher weights. There are good reasons as
to why environmental costs or benefits may increase over time. However, the
increasing value of environmental costs and benefits should be reflected in the
future shadow prices used. Indeed, the effect of assuming increasing value of
environmental costs or using a lower discount rate is, under certain assumptions,
exactly the same (Porter, 1982). For clarity and consistency in the analysis, the
12 The following exchange between Little and Mirlees, the authors of the standard manual on
"Project Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries" ilustrates the pragmatic
considerations underlying the choice of discount rates. Little explained: "... I said to professor
Mirlees that we should tind a way of producing an interest rate that the World Bank would
believe. They always want L O per cent or more, and most economists have been talking in terms
of a social discount rate of more like 4 or 5 per cent. The World Bank 'Ypuld not rmd that
credible. So the answer was to change the numéraire" (quoted in Berlage and Renard, 1985, p.
691). Little and Mirrlees (1974) and Squire and van der Tak (1975) use uncommitted foreign
exchange in the hands of governents as the numéraire in their analysis, not consumption (at the
average level), as Dasgupta et al. (1972) and others do. In principle, the choice of numéraire
should not affect the result of the CBA. In practice, however, it may do because the underlying
assumptions often change when numéraire is changed. See Berlage and Renard (1985) and Brent
(1990) for a discussion.
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adjustments should be made via the future shadow prices and not via the discount
rates.
To summarize, the issue of intergenerational distribution should form the
foundation for the choice of discount rate. Discount rates should not be lowered in
an attempt to avoid environmental damage. However, the rates presently used often
seem to be too high. Furthermore, the discount rate used canot be viewed in
isolation: it depends on the unit in which the costs and benefits are measured
(numéraire), and on how future costs and benefits are valued. The choice of
discount rate also involves elements of political choIce. The parameter n wil, as in
the discussion of distribution weights, be a politically determined parameter.
4 Do we still need sustainability screening?
The sustainability concern highlights two important issues. First, we need methods
to quantify and value environmental changes in order to include them in the formal
analysis, and thereby make them comparable to other types of costs and benefits.
Second, given that our concern for sustainability is basically a concern for the
welfare of the poor, both in the present and future generations, this concern should
be reflected in the weighting method applied. This relates in particular to the issues
of distributional weights and discounting. The Environmental and Social CBA
(ESCBA) put forward in this paper would result in a project portfolio which is
more environmental and povert oriented than using the conventional approach.
Some would argue that in spite of these extensions of the conventional practice of
CBA, there may be a need for sustainability screening before projects are accepted.
There are both theoretical and practical arguments in favour of this view.
Regarding the former, it may be argued that there is no guarantee that sustainability
wil be achieved even in the ESCBA. This is correct, and the reason is not
discounting, but the fact that one allows for substitution between goods. If one
believes that meeting a sustainability criterion (however defined) is a "must" for all
projects, then using only the ESCBA would be insufficient.
The obvious problem is to find a meaningful and operational criterion of
sustainability. Simple criteria like "always leave all kinds of natural resources at
the pre-project level" would be too rigid and impossible to apply in all cases. Some
trade-offs should be allowed, and that is exactly what economic analysis is about.
ESCBA provides a consistent way of balancing the various costs and benefits
involved. In our opinion, many writers treat the issue of defining meaningful
sustainability criteria too lightly. An exception is Ruttan (1994, p. 216), who in his
discussion of sustainable agricultural systems concludes that "sltstainability is
appropriately viewéd as a guide to future agricultural research agendas rather than a
guide to practice".
Moreover, the ESCBA gives us a more immediate reason for seriously taking into
account environmental effects, as we demonstrate how they will affect our present
and future welfare. Even though we do not like the separation between
18
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environmental and economic effects, which is not based on the theory anyway, it is
stil important to decision-makers. A clear demonstration of the costs of
environmental degradation wil prornote environmental conservation.
A more practical argument for the use of sustainability screening would be as
follows. Many environmental effects are both difficult to measure in physical terms
and difficult to value in monetar terms. It is argued that we need some rules of
thumb or more tractable selection criteria. We are more sympathetic to this
argument, particularly when a large amount of risk and uncertainty is involved. The
consequences for project selection may not be very different whether we apply only
the ESCBA or also include sustainability screening. The difficulty of defining
meaningful and operational criteria obliges us to remain with the problem of when
changes in natural resource stocks should be allowed. Introducing more or less
well-defined sustainability constraints may only redefine the original problem:
finding the optimal use of the environment, i.e., balancing different services
(resources) provided by ecological systems, and balancing short versus long term
uses.
At the same time we clearly see that more or less vague definitions of sustainable
development may have a role to play at the macro level in setting policy goals.
Policy objectives canot be determined through application of CBA. The shadow
prices, distribution weights and discount rates are cruciallinks between the macro
level goals and the micro level decisions (project assessment). Whereas many
countries have standard parameters to be used in project appraisal, they lack a
similar system for resource pricing (von Amsberg, 1993). The socIal costs ofusing
natural resources should be included in project assessments. In this way, the project
design and selection would contribute to the accomplishment of primarily policy
determined national environmental targets. This implies a movement towards a
system of Cost-Effective Analysis (CEA), where one finds the most efficient (in
the true meaning of the word) way to reach the targets.
While we share the same concern for environmental degradation and poverty in
LDCs with those we have criticized in this article, our strategy for addressing this
in project appraisal is somewhat different. We have stressed the need for a
consistent method, and that most alternatives put forward are insufficient.
Moreover, we argue that the main concern in the sustainability debate can be
integrated in the CBA framework. The past practice of overlooking environmental
effects, applying too high discount rates, and giving the same weight to income
changes for all groups, is not in line with basic economic principles. We believe a
strategy where one points to the faults of the practice, rather than misdirecting the
critique to the underlying theory, has much betler chances of success.
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